Fortunately for the US mainland, the 10 years since the game-changing September 11 of 2001 have passed without a successful terror strike, though several have been attempted by Al Qaeda. But the danger still looms, as the state of high alert in America on the tenth anniversary shows. In India, we have not been so lucky in this period. And yet, it can be argued that being in step with the US-initiated “war on terror” has not been without a dividend.
India was the destination of international terrorism launched from Pakistan years before 9/11. In fact, Pakistan consciously chose to emerge as “Terror International” to better target India in the early years of the anti-Soviet jihad launched jointly by the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’s military ruler at the time, made a bold decision (that would eventually backfire, politically speaking) to create several terrorist outfits with the sole remit of raining terrorist violence on India. But nobody was paying attention, certainly not Washington. Therefore, it didn’t matter in the chanceries of the world.
September 11 changed all that. America’s own efforts to target or contain terrorism worldwide in order to protect itself and its western allies brought the recognition, although this happened with considerable slowness, that the war on terror could not be won if democratic India remained under assault from non-state actors that were given sanctuary, training and weapons by unstable states and misguided sections of a religious community principally in those states.
Two key elements helped bring about this understanding. The first was that the outfits, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, initially focused on India, also in time became active participants in targeting the US in Afghanistan and also on the American mainland.
Two, with some effort India has been able to persuade the world that all the jihadist groups have a common ideological thread whose effect can be felt even if their individual grievances vary from country to country, region to region. Therefore, it is not a question of Al Qaeda alone, which has been Washington’s focus. America and some others appreciate this. But as yet there is insufficient coordination on the ground as between all these countries to deal with this aspect of the conundrum of international terrorism.
If in the last 10 years India has not been able to check heavy-duty jihadist terrorism aimed at it, the fault must lie at its own door. The attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in Srinagar, the attack on Parliament, the strike at Akshardham temple in Gujarat, the strike on military family quarters in Jammu, the Red Fort strike, the infamous 26/11 massacre in Mumbai, and numerous other incidents directed at iconic locations in Bengaluru, Hydereabad, Delhi and elsewhere, testify to India’s sloth, its lack of alertness, and refusal to learn lessons. For India, the pre-eminent gain from the changing contours of international relations since 9/11, is Afghanistan. If Pakistan-trained and equipped Taliban were still ruling, that country would have provided Pakistan what it calls “strategic depth” in the revanchist struggle it wages against India. In that event terrorist hits against India would have been made even easier. This is a factor of signal importance which we can overlook at our own peril.