D, we won’t be coming

“Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord.”
Romans 12:19 The Holy Bible (King James Version)

Scriptural injunctions together with America’s early frontier philosophy might well have inspired the official policy which culminated in Operation Geronimo. In this, special forces of the United States Navy Seal (Sea, Air and Land) Team Six finally killed Osama bin Laden “with extreme prejudice” on May 2, 2011, in Abbottabad, deep in the heartland of Pakistan.

The operation had commenced almost 10 years earlier. Immediately after the fall of the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, the then US President George W. Bush, publicly stated his determination “to bring the murderers to justice or bring justice to the murderers”. And US President Barack Obama finished what his predecessor had started.
For countries like India facing similar problems, the unilateral exercise of American capability might have been deprecated in public, but was undoubtedly admired in private. No other country could have done it and very few would dare emulate it even now.
Judging by its overall public impact, Operation Geronimo can certainly stake its claim to be the “mother of all special operations” (to paraphrase Saddam Hussein, another likely target had he been alive).
In this context it is important to differentiate between “special” and “covert” operations. The former are essentially high-visibility military operations, carried out by specially-trained and equipped military forces on critical, high-value targets. The latter are low-visibility human intelligence operations conducted by intelligence agencies separate from the military, but possibly incorporating some military manpower in individual capacities and based on underground networks of agents, operatives and informers, patiently cultivated and established over time. Though covert operations largely focus on gathering intelligence, under certain circumstances they can be extended to ultra-clandestine “black operations” for sabotage and physical elimination of specific targets as well.
Both categories can and often do form part of the same overall undertaking, as the Bin Laden episode illustrates perfectly.
A 10-year preliminary covert operation — the little known Cannonball — was conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to establish networks throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan for gathering intelligence on targeted individual. It was followed by the blitzkrieg heliborne “special” operation called Geronimo, which was conducted to eliminate Bin Laden, collect intelligence material including his body and exit the scene. Later, the Navy Seals were to board aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in north Arabian Sea. Indeed, as more details emerge it is clear that without the preliminary Cannonball, the Geronimo strike could not have taken place.
Interestingly, even with such intensive preparation, and notwithstanding the vast resources at CIA’s disposal, the final intelligence still remained imperfect and incomplete.
Mr Obama had to take final decision without assured confirmation of Bin Laden’s exact location. The chances of success — internally assessed — was between a high of 80 per cent and a low of an astonishing 40 per cent.
Three operational options for the Bin Laden compound are said to have been presented: an airstrike with precision weapons, a heliborne special operation with exclusively American forces, and a joint special operation with Pakistan’ Special Forces. The air attack option, though safest, was discarded because proof of success would not be conclusive. Also, there are no prizes for guessing why the joint US-Pakistani option did not get off the ground.
Geronimo is being hailed in the US as a great American victory, which has, in all probability, ensured Mr Obama’s success in the 2012 presidential elections.
It could just as easily have been a resounding American defeat like the disastrous failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980. The American Delta Force had failed to rescue US embassy staff held hostage in Tehran. This proved politically fatal for President Jimmy Carter who had launched the operation.
India must never forget its own public enemies enjoying sanctuary in neighbouring countries. The rising flood of information from both open and confidential sources about the Bin Laden operation has to be professionally studied and analysed in detail. We need to evolve practicable politico-military options available to this country to bring our own Bin Ladens to justice namely Dawood Ibrahim, Ilyas Kashmiri, Hafiz Saeed and others who have harmed the Indian state and caused grievous hurt to its people.
The American model may not be feasible with Indian capabilities and in the geopolitical environment of “no-war, no-peace” with a perennially intransigent neighbour.
Therefore, India has to develop its own operational options possibly based more on covert rather than special operations alternatives. Granted that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, it would appear to be politically more expedient for India to take a leaf out of the Inter-Services Intelligence book and adopt the low-profile option of covert operations if it is serious about bringing its own “most wanted” to book.
Meanwhile, India’s honorary Pakistanis in New Delhi are frothing at the mouth, indignant in media and cyberspace that the Chiefs of the Indian Army and Air Force should have reiterated, briefly and cryptically, the capabilities of their own respective services in this regard. It is a statement of fact that all three Indian defence services have their own extremely well-trained and highly-motivated special forces. It is no bad thing to convey this to the intended recipients in some appropriate manner. But special operations skills are as cutting edge as space technology, and just as perishable unless kept under constant review and upgradation, both technological as well as in special terms of service for these elite forces.
So, can India do it too? And indeed, does it at all want to? These are emotive but entirely natural questions. Even though they are irrelevant in the Indian context where the government has rejected all proactive measures and put its complete faith in the persuasive powers of dialogue even with a dismissive and often obdurate Pakistani establishment.
India’s message to the country’s own mixed bag of absconding public enemies is soothing. Dawood Ibrahim, Ilyas Kashmiri, Hafeez Saeed and others can all sleep in peace wherever they are — the Indians will not be coming.

Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament