Interpretation of Pak’s maladies

To understand the Pakistani mindset, one has to go back in history. Sir Syed Ahmed, addressing a meeting on March 16, 1888, stated, “Is it possible that the two nations — the Mohammedans and the Hindus — would sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not”. Jinnah succeeded in carving a separate nation state for Muslims. He had grandiose plans of the two wings of Pakistan in the West and the East being linked by a corridor passing through Muslim cultural centres like Delhi, Lucknow and Patna.

There was also wishful thinking about Hyderabad joining Pakistan. In the event, Jinnah got what he called a “moth-eaten” Pakistan with a divided Punjab and Bengal. This caused a feeling of deprivation among Pakistanis. It was accentuated by their not being able to get the Muslim majority state of Kashmir. Emergence of Bangladesh with Indian assistance made Pakistanis very revengeful.
The origin and history of Pakistan has been one of relentless hostility towards India. Indian leaders express goodwill for Pakistan and say that a stable, prosperous and democratic Pakistan is in India’s interest. No one in Pakistan has welcomed India emerging as an economic power. On the contrary, radicals hold large rallies threatening “jihad” against India, under their government’s benevolent eyes. Pakistan vehemently opposes India becoming a permanent member of the UNSC. Atal Behari Vajpayee, on a visit to Lahore, visited Minar-e-Pakistan. L.K. Advani paid handsome tribute to Jinnah at his mausoleum in Karachi. No Pakistani leader has ever visited Gandhiji’s samadhi. Pakistanis misinterpreted history and had a romanticised view of their martial superiority. They fancied themselves as descendants of the Central Asian conquerors of the medieval period, who repeatedly subdued India, and not as the descendants of the conquered, who converted to Islam. Their belief of martial superiority received a jolt in 1947, a setback in 1965, and got shattered in 1971. Having failed to defeat India in war, Pakistan took to cross-border terrorism. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto talked of a 1,000-year war against India and Gen. Zia formulated the strategy of a thousand cuts to bleed India to death. Gen. Kayani regards terrorists as strategic assets.
Pakistan has repeatedly committed aggression. A common feature is initial denial and, when the cat is out of the bag, silence. The 1947 invasion was first described as a freedom struggle of the people of Kashmir, with no involvement of the Pakistan Army. Major General Akbar Khan’s book, Raiders Over Kashmir, spilled the beans. In 1965, after similar denials, Gen. Musa, the then C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, wrote in his book, My Version, that Operation Gibraltar, launched by him, did not succeed because the people of Kashmir did not support the invasion. Similarly, in the case of Kargil in 1999, Pakistan initially denied involvement and even refused to accept the bodies of its slain soldiers. Gen. Musharraf, in his book In The Line of Fire, admitted Pakistan’s complicity in that war. In the case of cross-border terrorism, after repeated denials, Lt. Gen. Javed Nasser, a former ISI chief when a Cabinet minister, revealed in the Pakistan National Assembly that the ISI had been organising cross-border terrorism. Mr Musharraf has recently confirmed that Pakistan had been training the terrorists. The same story was repeated in the case of Kasab, the lone terrorist captured on 26/11. Pakistan denied he was Pakistani. With overwhelming evidence from international sources, Pakistan retraced its steps. It is dragging its feet in taking action against Lashkar-e-Tayyaba leaders and ISI officers who masterminded and directed that horrendous attack. Pakistan’s 1947 invasion of Kashmir violated the Standstill Agreement. In 1965, it violated the Cease Fire Agreement. Cross-border terrorism, which started in 1989, violated the Shimla Accord. The Kargil intrusion violated the Lahore Declaration. Despite Mr Musharraf’s commitment to stop cross-border terrorism in January 2004, this continued, and the most heinous attack, that of 26/11, took place. Matters have been further compounded by Pakistan getting consumed by hate and violence. The assassinations of governor Salman Taseer followed by that of minister Shahbaz Bhatti have been hailed by the vast majority with the small liberal minority terrified into silence.
Notwithstanding this dismal scenario, we should not remain mired in the past. We must endeavour to build good relations with Pakistan. However, while doing so, we must not ignore the past. The view that if the Kashmir issue is resolved Indo-Pak relations will get normalised is misconceived. Kashmir is the symptom, not the disease.
Pakistan wants to be at par with India in all respects, ignoring geographic and economic realities. Foreign powers hyphenated the two countries. That era appears over, with India emerging as a major economic power and Pakistan kept alive on life-support from the US. Pakistan’s endeavour has been to tar India’s image with the same terrorist brush.
The Havana agreement equated perpetrators of terrorism with the victims of that scourge. At Sharm el-Sheikh they tried to show that like Pakistan in Kashmir, India was promoting terrorism in Baluchistan. The terrorist attack of 26/11 is now sought to be equated with the attack on the Samjhauta Express. The latter was not launched across an international border nor by a state agency. Despite contrary inputs from US intelligence, Indian agencies unearthed evidence and are now prosecuting the guilty.
Politicians who talk about “Hindu” or “saffron terror” and maintain that it is more dangerous than “jihadi terror” are only playing into Pakistan’s hand. Pakistan has been trying to play the China card against India. With the latter emerging as a leading economic power that may soon overtake the declining superpower, Pakistan may play the China card against the US despite all the sustaining billions it has been receiving from it. It has been exploiting its indispensability to blackmail the US. When action was taken against Chinese citizens, Musharraf promptly ordered the attack on the Lal Masjid seminary. When US journalist Daniel Pearl was beheaded, or when US “diplomat” Raymond Davis was apprehended, Pakistan has been defying the US, as with attacks in Pakistan on Nato convoys en route to Afghanistan.
Dialogue with Pakistan must be from a position of military strength. This requires that we retain our conventional military superiority over Pakistan at all times, with convincing second-strike Triad nuclear capability from land, air and underwater. We must also develop anti-missile capability to destroy attacking missiles in space. At the same time, we should ensure impregnable defence in the Himalayas to prevent another 1962. Our military strength must be suitably supplemented with sound foreign policy, ensuring good relations with other foreign powers. However, we should rely primarily on our own strength and not be pressured or become dependent on any power. It is only under such circumstances that dialogue with Pakistan can be successful — without India sacrificing her national interests and without following any misconceived policy of appeasement.

The author, a retired lieutenant-general, was Vice-Chief of Army Staff and has served as governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir.