Peace politics

Assam is the key state of the Northeast (N-E). Its population is more than double the combined population of the remaining seven states of the region and its natural resources, in terms of oil, tea and minerals, far surpass those of all the other N-E states. Its geo-strategic location is crucial — surface communications to the other N-E states pass through Assam. If Assam gets cut off from the mainland, so does the entire land mass of the N-E.
Tribal insurgencies in the N-E affect a small segment of our population in the peripheral areas. The Naga insurgency has lost steam with the ceasefire holding in Nagaland for the last 14 years. Insurgency in Manipur continues as a low-key affair. The Mizo insurgency was resolved through a political settlement and installation of the undisputed insurgent leader, Laldenga, as chief minister of Mizoram. Attempts to replicate the Mizoram model in Assam, or Jammu and Kashmir, are unlikely to succeed because of demographic diversity and there being no one undisputed leader in these sates. The people of Assam felt discriminated against by the Centre in various ways. Assam had been left out of the Green Revolution. It was denied full benefits from its oil and tea resources. The unabated influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, encouraged by the ruling party for its votebank, has been affecting the state’s demographic profile: the Assamese fear they may become a minority in their own state.
In 1979, the Election Commission found the names of 70,000 illegal migrants in the voter list of Mangaldoi constituency. This ignited widespread upheaval in the state. A peaceful students’ movement with unprecedented mass support was started. Concurrently, United Liberation Front of Asom (Ulfa) militancy started in tandem and gained great momentum, garnering tremendous resources during the five years of Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) rule in the Eighties. The AGP government was dismissed and the Army called out to restore normalcy. It inflicted heavy attrition on Ulfa.
Arbinda Rajkhowa, the president of Ulfa, and Anup Chetia, its general secretary, agreed to peace talks in 1992 but wanted to bring Ulfa commander-in-chief Paresh Baruah from Bangladesh. They were allowed to go to that country for that purpose but they went underground and did not return. The Ulfa armed cadres set up camps in the jungles on the foothills of Bhutan while the Ulfa leadership was comfortably ensconced in Bangladesh. Then there was widespread popular support in Assam for Ulfa.
Insurgency was at its peak in 1997 when I took over as governor of Assam. I remained in that appointment for six years, till 2003. We worked on a three-pronged strategy — unified command, economic development and psychological initiatives. Each prong yielded rich dividends. We had been fighting insurgency in the N-E for 40 years, yet we did not have a unified command. The Army, paramilitary and police were acting more as competing, rather than complementary, forces. The setting up of a unified command, with the Army coordinating operations, proved highly successful. We inflicted heavy attrition on Ulfa — 2,500 killed in encounters while 3,000 surrendered with weapons. This broke their back. On the economic front, our major achievement was to install one lakh shallow tube wells. This turned Assam from a rice-deficit to a rice-surplus state. As for psychological initiatives, my 42-page printed report to the President recommending repeal of the obnoxious Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) (IMDT) Act and other measures to stop illegal migration, which had been the rootcause of insurgency in Assam, took the people by storm. Various psychological initiatives with high emotive content were undertaken. The icons of Assam were projected as national heroes. Our declared aim was to make the people of Assam proud of their past and the rest of India proud of Assam. Ulfa was isolated from the people. The rural people apprehended 81 Ulfa militants in different incidents. The Ulfa surrenders began to be witnessed appreciatively by thousands of people. Although the success achieved by us in Assam went largely unnoticed in our country, it drew attention in the US. Dr Anne Simons, in her monograph for the US’ National War College, mentions Assam as a counter-insurgency success story of the 20th century.
The gains of 2003 were frittered away for extraneous reasons. The IMDT Act, struck down by the Supreme Court, was brought back through the backdoor by the Central government, amending the Foreigners Tribunal Order of 1964. With the 2006 Assembly elections approaching, the state government ordered suspension of operations in January 2004. Ulfa stragglers encircled in the jungles north of Dibrugarh faced extinction. In an ill-conceived attempt to win over Ulfa, indirect talks through a peace consultative group were started. This process dragged on for over a year without any result. This suited Ulfa as it gave them all the time to reinforce and regroup. It was allowed to resuscitate itself for electoral gains at the cost of national security. The armed outfit responded by attacking Independence Day celebrations at a school in Dhemaji in which some 30 schoolchildren were killed. Emboldened by its new-found strength, Ulfa started periodic terrorist strikes. There was no support for them from the people. The National Games were to be held at Guwahati in 2007. The chief minister appealed to Ulfa not to disturb the games. This further strengthened Ulfa’s armed clout.
In 2010, the Bangladesh government handed over Arabinda Rajkhowa and some other top Ulfa leaders to India. Paresh Baruah escaped to China. Almost all the top Ulfa leaders were now in our captivity. With state Assembly elections to be held in April, the state government has tried to woo the rebel leadership. Rajkhowa and other top leaders were released on bail to hold unconditional peace talks. He was given a hero’s welcome all over Assam, with welcome arches and huge crowds. He has now declared that there can be no compromise on his demand for independence for Assam. Baruah has opposed the holding of talks and wants to continue the struggle. There are reports of Ulfa leaders holding secret conclaves. Recruitment and training of rebel cadres have started. Some rebel leaders have openly vowed to avenge the attacks on their camps by the Royal Bhutan Army in December 2003. Bhutan has apprised India of its concerns. The reaction of Bangladesh, threatened by Islamists, is not known; however, Ulfa leaders have links with the latter. There is every possibility of Rajkhowa escaping again, as in 1992, and joining Baruah in China. Beijing has a golden opportunity to destabilise India in Assam. No matter what happens in the forthcoming Assembly elections in Assam, we have brought about a grave threat to our national security for petty electoral gain.

The author, a retired lieutenant-general, was Vice-Chief of Army Staff and has served as governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir.