COIN has two sides

Nangarhar province in Afghanistan, Nord Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Al Anbar province in Iraq are the themes of three case studies presented in a Rand Corporation report titled “Reconstruction Under Fire — Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency”. These regions are light years apart from each other in terms of local environments, ethnicities and cultures, and certainly so from the jungles of Goaltore, an adivasi region in the heart of the Maoist-infested West Midnapur district, West Bengal, where Sidhu Soren, aka Bhuta Baskey, leader of the Sidhu Kanu Mass Militia, was killed in a police raid. Yet, all of them, whether in Africa, West Asia, South Asia, or in the adivasi heartlands of India, can also be visualised at another level as hot spots of internal conflicts closely bonded by the common links of catastrophic failures of governance which have denied the local population the benefits of well being and prosperity.
Like many difficult problems, counterinsurgency, or COIN, is deceptively simple in theory but layered and complex in execution, involving complementary actions by military as well as civil agencies to achieve the ultimate grand strategic objective of securing the “hearts and minds” of affected populations. These integrate operations to “clear” insurgents from areas under their control, “hold” these to prevent their return, and then “build” administrative, economic and social infrastructure. In journalistic jargon which is now familiar, counterinsurgency thus requires both military as well as civilian “surges” by security forces as well as civil administration. Of these, it is the aspect of the “military surge” which is generally highlighted in the media, but not so the “civilian surge” which is equally essential because counterinsurgency is a politico-military as well as socio-economic venture which has to be implemented within Mao Zedong’s “sea of people”. It is a contrarian enterprise without any guaranteed assurances of success, but lack of effective civil followup can certainly assure failure. The Rand case study focuses on this latter aspect of counterinsurgency, and suggests an analytical framework for its planning, wherein the social, economic and political context of the situation have to be incorporated as operational factors to be quantified and assessed, juxtaposed against insurgent organisations, personalities and capabilities.
Public infrastructure symbolises government presence and is therefore one of the main targets of insurgents, because their destruction carries its own powerful reverse symbolism of defeating the government, besides enforcing acquiescence to insurgent terror. Surface communications, government buildings and even schools are systematically attacked amongst which road construction parties and their equipment are particularly singled out, while schools and public buildings are destroyed because they can be used as accommodation for security personnel. Protection of civil assets is another problem which has to be tackled appropriately in conjunction with security agencies. An example, though in a different context, is the manner in which the Taliban in Afghanistan were being directed by their mentors from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to focus their attacks on infrastructure being constructed by India, particularly the Indian Army’s Border Roads Organisation building the strategic Zaranj-Delaram road linking Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf through Iran. The road construction was pushed through under security provided by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police deployed in Afghanistan through agreement with the Afghan government, and is a good indicator of how similar projects in Maoist regions should be carried out.
“Reconstruction under fire” is exactly that — construction of civil infrastructure in disturbed areas in the face of insurgent attacks and their protection and maintenance thereafter in close coordination with security operations. This requires deliberate planning as a discrete and separate component fitted into the overall counterinsurgency strategy, and must flow from a basic socio-economic analysis of the affected areas within which government forces are required to operate. In the Indian context of counter-Maoist operations, the “operational environment” includes the socio-economics and socio-politics of the 200-odd adivasi-inhabited districts in the country where Maoist insurgencies have taken hold. But if the present pattern of splintered disparate operations, under individual states and their agencies is anything to go by, it is very doubtful whether any such socio-economic exercise has been even thought of, leave alone carried out. Also, given the constant state of fractious politics in the states as well as the Centre, there is equally no time for any institutional focus on future planning to evolve suitable long-term policies to stabilise the situation. The current obsession with periodic “development packages” to disturbed areas are generally hypocritical cosmetics by visiting political firemen, always with an eye to the next elections, which seem not to have achieved any worthwhile results so far. But far outweighing the clear and present dangers are the potentials for future peril because the signals conveyed to other areas equally backward but as yet relatively unaffected are that development and economic benefit can be brought about only through armed blackmail, because government systems do not seem to respond to any other stimulus.
The government realises, though perhaps rather late in the day, that the smouldering resentment in rural areas generated by long neglect of economic development, has ultimately manifested itself as a Maoist insurgency, a classic pattern worldwide now replicating itself in India. But India is more fortunate than many other countries similarly placed, because of its established political system (though with many failings, like all democracies) along with an extensive and experienced civil administrative infrastructure. These now have to be optimally utilised in what is certainly an emergent situation.
One such alternative which merits consideration is a programme of “pre-emptive development” of civil infrastructure on an emergent basis throughout the country, to forestall dissatisfaction arising in fresh areas which are still comparatively peaceful, but remain backward. These could be through specially accelerated programmes of good governance and socio-economic development at district-level “special development zones” (on the analogy of “special economic zones”) and implemented by special administrative task forces on the analogy of “Provincial Reconstruction Teams” being attempted in Afghanistan. But whatever is the method adopted, it has to be remembered — time is running out.

Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former Member of Parliament