Dealing with a Romney presidency

It has become a virtual staple of Indian political discourse that Republican administrations are more sympathetic towards India than their Democratic counterparts. The popularity of this notion notwithstanding, it is factually incorrect.

In considerable part the salient choices of the two recent Bush administrations, most notably the monumental US-India civilian nuclear agreement that looms large in the minds of most Indian political observers, shapes this view. Consequently, earlier gestures and overtures of many a Democratic administration are simply swept aside and forgotten. For example, during the early Cold War, Democratic administrations were the staunchest advocates for foreign assistance towards India. Nor should it be overlooked that the Republican regime of Richard Nixon was one of the most intransigent when it came to dealing with India.
This form of historical amnesia can prove to be costly for the country as the US presidential election looms this November. In the wake of the Republication presidential convention in Tampa, Florida, most national polls suggest that a few percentage points separate US President Barack Obama from his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney. It remains an open question if this gap will widen or close after the Democratic convention in Charlotte, North Carolina on September 4. Much depends on who can persuade those fence-sitters now capable of determining the fate of either candidate.
In the event Mr Romney can sway undecided independent voters to his cause, he will successfully overtake Mr Obama and win the election. What then might a Romney foreign policy look like and how might it affect India and South Asia? Some Indian commentators have taken heart from the amount of attention that the Republican platform devoted to India. Making robust inferences from those paragraphs, however, can be quite misleading.
Admittedly, on some issues, given their very different core constituencies, the two leaders will have different views on matters of concern to India such as outsourcing. Mr Romney, who has little use for labour unions, will not attempt to halt the outsourcing of work to India and elsewhere. His principal constituency remains large American corporations who will seek competitive opportunities abroad and will expect their candidate to be supportive of their interests. Accordingly, many in India’s service sector
will breathe multiple sighs of relief.
That said, if India’s economic policymakers were piqued with the Obama administration’s periodic prodding to speed liberal economic reforms, they should brace themselves for a far more demanding set of expectations from a Romney administration. In its quest to boost American jobs and promote economic growth, there is every likelihood that a Romney administration will ardently seek new export markets and investment opportunities. Accordingly, its negotiators will drive a tougher bargain with their Indian interlocutors.
India can also expect unyielding bargaining tactics in other arenas. For example, despite differences with India on how best to deal with the apparent clandestine Iranian quest for nuclear weapons, the Obama administration has not resorted to strong-arm tactics. Nor has it engaged in much public grandstanding in highlig hting its displeasure with India’s continuing (and even expanding) ties with Iran. A Romney administration, however, far more attuned to foreign policy hard lines within the Republican Party, is far more likely to adopt a harsh negotiating stance. It is, of course, entirely possible that such a posture will prove to be utterly counter-productive. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to believe that one can reasonably expect policy continuity in this critical arena despite a change in administrations.
How might a Romney administration deal with the question of the future of American involvement in Afghanistan? Despite much public bravado, unless it wishes to continue bankrupting the American treasury, it is more than likely to continue with the policies of the Obama administration. Consequently, the troop withdrawals will continue, greater pressure will be mounted on the Karzai regime to assume expanded security responsibilities and the drone attacks, Pakistan’s periodic protests aside, will persist. What remains unclear, however, is what role the Romney administration might envisage for India in Afghanistan’s future.
In a related vein, what will happen to the US-Pakistan relationship? This is an issue of no small concern to India’s policymakers. At this stage it is difficult to make any sound predictions about the matter. Two factors, however, will play a key role in shaping the new administration’s policy towards this unreliable and contentious ally. First, much will depend on whose advice Mr Romney seeks to inform his policies towards Pakistan. If some within Washington D.C.’s foreign and security policy circles, who have been staunch apologists for Pakistan, manage to inveigle themselves into his policy-making apparatus, one can again see a return to the days when Pakistan’s errant behaviour will be overlooked. Second, Pakistan’s choices in the next few months and the early days of the Romney presidency will also shape policy choices. If Pakistan continues to resist American pressures to act against a number of key terrorist organisations operating from its soil, even its sympathisers within a Romney administration will have difficulty in making a case for coddling Pakistan.
As Indian policymakers look towards November and await the outcome of the elections, it may well behove them to shed the popular (and questionable) assumptions about America’s two principal political parties and their views of India and the region. Times change, parties shift their political preferences and policy goals differ. Failing to recognise these shifts and relying upon outdated views could prove damaging to India’s interests.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, US