A doctrine of no use

India is a “status quoits” power that will never venture strategically beyond its borders. But threat to national security in the 21st century encompasses, in addition to conventional war, asymmetrical warfare, cyberspace war, demographic changes due to illegal immigration and rare earth elements (REEs) scarcity.

To deal with these challenges, India needs a revamped higher defence management (HDM) and a new holistic strategic approach.
Demographic changes in the Northeast due to the influx of an estimated 20 to 25 million illegal Bangladeshi migrants has led to ethnic clashes in recent weeks. These were followed by the use of hate SMSes and morphed photographs, which caused mass panic and the movement of Northeast students from South India back to the Northeast. China’s repeated cyber attacks on the Indian government and military security systems and websites are well known. In addition, the Pune bomb blasts on July 1 and bomb blasts in Manipur on August 15, along with Abu Jundal’s revelations on August 11 about Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s plan to carry out attacks on Indian cities, indicate that our homeland security apparatus too needs drastic upgrade.
The two North India power blackouts from grid collapse on July 30 and 31, 2012, were rectified within a few hours. While the electric trains came to a grinding halt, other critical services managed to operate on standby emergency generators.
A prolonged power blackout has massive security implications since power may not be available to our command, communications and weapons systems while management of airspace (including civilian flights) and coastal surveillance (both relying on radars and other electronic communications devices) would be disrupted. Terrorist sleeper cells can utilise such opportunities to wreak havoc. Energy security is vital for India’s economic growth, and it is even more so for national security.
While the issue of energy security is easily understood, very few are aware of the emerging global crisis of REEs security.
REEs, comprising 17 rare elements (difficult to locate, mine and process), are crucial for numerous industries and defence applications. Today, the global annual demand is about 136,000 tonnes, while production till 2010 was 133,600 tons. China, which holds 97 per cent of the world’s REEs, had by 2011, reduced its annual global export to about 31,000 tonnes, as compared to its original 65,000 tonnes, leading to a massive (estimated to be over 2,500 per cent) increase in REEs prices. India, which has an estimated 3.1 million tonnes of REE reserves, has belatedly tied up with Japan to export REEs to Japan and also to set up facilities for mining, production, recycling and reprocessing of REEs in India.
Our two nuclear-armed neighbours are aware of India’s shortcomings. Today Pakistani and Chinese nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missiles can target the whole of mainland India as well as Lakshadweep & Mincoy islands (China can additionally target our Andaman and Nicobar islands also). India has not responded to Vietnam’s offer, made in 2011, for establishing a naval base in its territory. Recently, when Vietnam again offered India an oil exploration block in its waters in the South China Sea, China promptly put up the same block for international bidding. In end-August 2012, China conducted an “air-ground” exercise in Tibet, which was aimed against India, a “defensive enemy”.
India is the only nuclear weapon state in the world with a “no first use” (NFU) doctrine. China has a doctrine of “NFU against non-nuclear powers”. Pakistan has an India-centric “first use” doctrine. Pakistan also has a policy of using low-yield Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) on conventional battlefields. Such weapons are in the one to five kilotonne range, and cause “limited damage” (within a two-km radius).
As is well known, 70 per cent of India’s energy (oil and gas) is imported. Most of these imports come by sea from West Asia to Vadinar, Gujarat, in the Gulf of Kutch. If Vadinar and its facilities are destroyed in a terrorist or conventional military attack, it will have very serious repercussions on our economy and war-fighting ability. To deter such an attack, should India declare that it would retaliate with nuclear weapons if its core national interests are attacked?
India needs a transparent debate on whether it needs to make changes to its NFU nuclear doctrine so as to provide calibrated response options for different scenarios. Should we emulate China’s nuclear doctrine of “NFU against non-nuclear weapon states”? Should we induct TNWs, with adequate safeguards against accidental use, and with the proviso that “TNWs may be used against enemy troops on Indian soil if our ‘red lines’ are crossed”? This will address the issue of providing deterrence, despite the asymmetry, against a combined Chinese-Pakistani conventional attack, along with threats of using TNWs against us.
India’s higher defence management needs changes, as suggested in May 2012 by the Naresh Chandra Committee. Their proposals reportedly include the creation of a permanent four-star Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, integration of Service Headquarters with MoD, shifting strategic focus from Pakistan to China, preparing for asymmetric war, border management, measures to ensure energy security and REE security, among
others.
The damage done by annoying a friendly neighbour like Sri Lanka, due to compulsions of domestic Tamil Nadu politics, is evident in the Sri Lankan Navy repeatedly firing on Indian fishermen (the last such incident was in early August 2012). The focused Chinese have replaced India as Sri Lanka’s “trusted friend”.
Also, if Vietnam’s offer of a naval base in the Asia-Pacific region is politically unacceptable, then the only viable alternative is for the Indian Navy to induct additional tactical nuclear submarines (SSNs) which can operate at great distances without base support and do not cause “diplomatic ripples” in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region.
India should be prepared for the worst-case scenario, for a situation may quickly and seamlessly transition from a terror attack to a conventional war, to a nuclear conflict. National security and prosperity are two sides the same coin, and need the same top
priority.

The author, a former vice-admiral, retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam