The real point is whether around half a dozen men with automatic weapons can pierce layers of security at a premium military facility without insider help
The real point is whether around half a dozen men with automatic weapons can pierce layers of security at a premium military facility without insider help
The assault by armed militants — thought to be Pakistani Taliban — on the Minhas airbase at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex in Kamra, not far from Islamabad, renews anxiety about the security of important military installations in that country.
The Kamra base had been hit by militants in 2007 and 2009 as well, but this time the five-hour firefight to thwart extremists occurred within the complex, with Air Commodore Muhammad Azam, the base commander, taking a bullet in his shoulder. In May last year the Mehran naval base at Karachi, the country’s biggest, had been assaulted for 16 hours.
If key establishments of high military value can be successfully attacked on a regular basis, the question does arise if Pakistan’s nuclear installations are safe from assault by Islamist groups. If the answer is in the negative, jihadists could lay their hands on nuclear weapons in the hope of targeting India, not really bothering with the thought that any such attempt could bring on massive retaliation.
It is this factor of unpredictability about the Islamists which should be of concern to this country.
The Pakistan Air Force has denied some Western suggestions that the Kamra airbase also stored nuclear warheads. It can only be speculated if the denial has factual viability. The real point, though, is whether around half a dozen men with automatic weapons and a rocket-propelled grenade can pierce layers of security at a premium military facility without insider help. In the Mehran case, some naval personnel were thought to be mixed up with the jihadists, although it is not clear if any were prosecuted and convicted.
Pakistan is said to move its nuclear arsenal around in order to shield it from possible attack, preferring this strategy to one of permanent storage at fixed locations. Theft by an Islamist group can occur in this process. But stealing a weapon makes sense only if it can be mated with the trigger. This cannot be done without the codes and authorisations. Alternatively, the thieves should be able to develop a trigger for, let’s say, a sub-kiloton device. Both means are available to a group which can command insider support.
The idea is no longer preposterous. Some years ago, a Pakistani nuclear scientist was part of a cabal that travelled to meet Osama bin Laden. This is why the Americans no longer believe Pakistani nukes are theft-proof. Indian specialists, too, do not entirely rule out the possibility of help to jihadists from within the Pakistan military and nuclear establishment. Pakistan is not yet a failed state. But the Mehran and Kamra attacks are symptoms of a likely descent into chaos. We ought to be vigilant even as we aspire for normal ties.
