Mutiny and the bounty

“Quem deus
vult perdere,
dementat prius”
(Those whom the gods would destroy they
first make mad)
— Ancient saying, generally attributed to the Greek playwright Euripides (480-406 BC)

If Euripides had found himself in present-day India, chances are he would have felt perfectly at home. How else to perceive, except as collective madness, the recent deluge of rumours, insinuations, selective leaks, allegations and slanted commentary in the media, all targeting the apex command personality of the Indian Army, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS)? Names are not important in this context, but the institution of the COAS and the office he holds definitely are. The way the incident has played out in sections of the media has grievously damaged and devalued the institution of the COAS and the Indian Army itself. The incident adversely affects national security in terms of morale and motivation of troops, and demands answers urgently.
The incident has thrown up issues of troop movement and defence procurement. These are two unconnected and disparate issues. In the former case, a relatively minor and routine movement of troops in January towards training areas near Delhi involving two pint-sized military elements reportedly from cantonments in Agra, Uttar Pradesh, and Hisar, Haryana, has been warped and twisted by overheated journalistic imaginations into “unauthorised” troop movements towards the national capital with the intention of carrying out a coup! Such rumours are, of course, unbelievably ridiculous, and the senior and well-established media personalities who are the originators of this report should provide answers for the national paranoia created by these reports. Whether it happened by accident or design is not yet clear, but that these speculations should at all have spooked the government at the highest political levels reflect a high degree of mistrust about the Army amongst those who should know better. India has been made to look like a banana republic, and it is time that the whole affair was investigated thoroughly and answers placed before the public.
The background to such troop movements in peacetime must be understood. To maintain their operational efficiency and preparedness at all times, the Indian Army (and its sister services — the Indian Navy and the Air Force) have to maintain a grinding training regimen at all levels of command throughout the year. For this, the Army requires extensive areas for manoeuvre and live firing which are simply not available in the vicinity of military cantonments. Units and formations perforce have to periodically migrate to the fast-dwindling numbers of training areas and field-firing ranges, most of which are located in the relatively sparsely populated desert regions along the India-Pakistan border, and some in central India. In addition, there are periodic visits to refresh knowledge of wartime-deployment areas. All these result in a steady flow of military movement by road convoys, troop trains and, occasionally, by air, and some of the routes used for this purpose do transit around the national capital. This routine has been in practice for decades and it may be interesting to note in this context that Nato forces stationed in the heavily urbanised areas of western Europe face similar problems, and have to travel all the way to Canada for live firing and major manoeuvres.
The reported movement of the two units from Agra and Hisar, which raised an overheated storm in a teacup, was one such utterly routine training movement. Allegations of a planned “Chalo Dilli” by presumed “mutineers” are laughable, but could result in a knee-jerk reaction of imposing stricter restrictions on troop movements in peacetime, even for training purposes. The consequent deleterious effects on operational efficiency and readiness would be evident.
The issue of defence procurement has also been prominently highlighted in the media. Here it must be understood that notwithstanding proforma denials by successive governments, it is evident that the ghost of Bofors is yet to be laid completely to rest, and its fallout continues to bedevil and inhibit the entire process of defence modernisation. Even though no military culpability has ever emerged even after prolonged investigations, the Bofors controversy has left a precautionary tale for military commanders concerned with acquisition and induction of new equipment. The lesson brought out by the veiled innuendoes about corruption in the acquisition of military equipment is that delays in defence modernisation are irrelevant, and inaction is always safer than action in matters of defence acquisitions and procurements. The Kolos Tatra heavy tractor, which has featured in media releases, has rendered yeoman service to the Indian Army for over two decades and has long proved its worth as a rugged and reliable multi-purpose vehicle.
The current media blitz about alleged corruption in defence procurement has centred around an attempt at bribery personally reported by the COAS himself to the Raksha Mantri. Its twists and turns have been played out in the media, which came out all guns blazing. But there is one major flaw in the entire proceedings — the media’s artillery was engaging the wrong target, because the role of the Indian Army in the process of defence acquisitions is confined to user trials of the equipment proposed to be acquired, and sending the finalised recommendations to the ministry of defence. The stringent thoroughness of Indian Army trial teams is known and respected by weapons suppliers while the subsequent stages of commercial negotiations are reserved as the exclusive preserve and prerogative of the civilian bureaucracy in the ministries of defence, defence finance and finance. Has the time come to incorporate the military end-user further into the process of defence procurement, extending into the management of contracts and financial negotiations? The answer is in the affirmative with the important proviso that the military representatives function as fully empowered components of an integrated ministry of defence. Judging by intense bureaucratic opposition to any such proposal it would, of course, have little hope of seeing the light of day. But the bureaucracy would not have it any other way.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff and a former member of Parliament