Nuclear threat to Indo-Pak ties

Does anyone remember the time when it used to be argued — convincingly enough, in my opinion — that if Pakistan could overtly go nuclear, its security concerns would be taken care of and the way would thus be cleared for at least a modus vivendi, if not rapprochement, between the two old adversaries, India and Pakistan? It was Agha Shahi, a former foreign minister of the western neighbour who, way back in the 1980s, had publicly made out a strong case for Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons. “There is no other way,” he had argued, “we can ever match India’s overwhelming conventional superiority that hangs over our heads like the Sword of Damocles.” In June 1998, both the South Asian countries proclaimed to the wide world, loud and clear, that they were nuclear weapons powers. However, nearly a decade and a half later, has it made much difference to Indo-Pakistani suspicions and fears of each other?
The need to ask these questions at this stage has arisen from a rather encouraging development.
Last week there was a three-day India-Pakistan Civil Society Review of Strategic Relations between the two countries under the auspices of the Centre for Policy Alternatives. The discussion on the nuclear issue turned out to be refreshingly constructive though there were inevitable differences and some claims and counter-claims. The main recommendation to emerge was that the two countries should conclude a No-War Pact. For, if there were no war, there wouldn’t be any danger of its escalation to nuclear annihilation.
Of course, the Kargil War was fought without leading to a nuclear exchange. Nor did such outrages as the attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 or 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks in 2008 lead to the any military clash. But obviously such a state of affairs cannot last indefinitely. Pakistan cannot go on starting limited wars or using terrorist outfits to bleed India by a thousand cuts. On the other hand, Pakistan has its misgiving about “Cold Start”, this country’s reported doctrine on a two-front war.
However, given the ground realities, the two government and societies should take the idea of a No-War Pact seriously. For this is best possible way to take care of nuclear risks amidst adversarial relations. The idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia makes no sense. For the nuclear powerplay is not taking place in a watertight compartment extending from the Khyber Pass to Cox’s Bazar. The greatest nuclear threat to India emanates from mighty China that has helped Pakistan acquire the bomb and is currently building four plutonium production plants at Khushab. This is, of course, Pakistan’s antidote to the Indo-US nuclear deal the denial of which rankles in Islamabad.
In this context, it is also notable that Pakistan has the world’s “fastest growing nuclear arsenal”. It is said to possess 90 to 110 warheads and an inventory of uranium and plutonium capable of producing 160-240 warheads. Both are larger than India’s corresponding stockpiles. But this ought not to be a cause for concern. Beyond a point the number of warheads does not matter and to go an adding to the nuclear arsenals is folly as the US and the Soviet Union/Russia realised too late.
A nuclear weapon is indeed an equaliser. Time was when China possessed no more than 30 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as against thousands of the US. Yet, during a major crisis across the Taiwan Straits, a Chinese general could publicly tell America not to use threats about Taiwan but “worry about San Francisco and New York”.
Moreover, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are India-specific, as Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who remains an important member of the Nuclear Command and Control even after retirement, has stated. He also has spelt out four situations — essentially if India overwhelms his country militarily or economically — in which nuclear weapons would be used. India, on the other hand, has the doctrine of No First Use and no use at all against non-nuclear countries. Pakistan hasn’t shown any inclination to accept this principle, nor has it pronounced any doctrine so far.
Much more urgent and worrisome in the problem of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of ubiquitous terrorists — a matter on which far greater concern is expressed by Western powers than by this country.
In fact, this was one of the major items on the agenda of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul only the other day.
At the Delhi gathering, one of the Pakistani delegates, Pervez Hoodbhoy, an erudite professor of nuclear science and a forthright writer, had a new angle on Pakistan’s fast-expanding nuclear arsenal. More than India, he said, it was the recurring American threat to “seize” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons ostensibly to save them from terrorists that was behind the current flurry to produce more and more warheads. He reckoned the US threat to be real and cited a report by the well-known American journalist, Seymour Hersh, to the effect that having sent a task force for exactly this purpose, Washington called it back from Dubai.
Evidently, Pakistanis believe that should the US decide to seize their nuclear weapons it would succeed, as it did in eliminating Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad. Therefore, their response is to build more and more weapons and move them from place to place constantly so that America cannot get its hands on the entire arsenal.
As was perhaps to be expected at the India-Pakistan conference there was strong support for total elimination of nuclear weapons that has won the endorsement of even by the most enthusiastic advocates of nuclear weaponry such as Henry Kissinger. What came as a surprise, at least to me, was the extent and intensity of the audience’s feelings, especially among the young, against nuclear power. Fukushima seems to have had a huge impact. The country does need nuclear energy. But the Establishment needs to first win over public opinion, and only then embark on an ambitious programme.