Can Taiwan stay out of Beijing’s clutches?

Taiwan punches much above its weight because circumstances and the feisty nature of the Taiwanese people have combined to place it along the fault line of Sino-US relations. And for the first time in the long history of Chinese civilisation, after decades of authoritarian Kuomintang (KMT) rule following Chiang Kai-shek’s hasty departure from mainland China in 1948, Taiwan practises a robust form of democracy.
The Taiwanese presidential election next Saturday (January 14) therefore has connotations beyond the fortunes of the incumbent, President Ma Ying-jeou, and his rival, Tsai Ing-wen of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). During his four years in office President Ma has changed the choreography of cross-Strait relations by allowing Chinese tourists to visit the island, introduced direct flights, eased investment rules and signed 16 agreements with the mainland, including the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.
Closer relations have, indeed, helped the Taiwanese and there was a measure of relief after the previous President of the DPP, Chen Shui-bian, raised the cross-Strait temperature, and American anxieties, by periodically flying the banner of independence for the island. Beijing did not help matters by its threats to seize the island by force. Chen left the presidency after two terms in office on a tragic note, convicted and imprisoned as he was on corruption charges, but his successor, Ms Tsai, has rebuilt the party winning legislative and local elections.
Over the decades, the discourse in Taiwan is governed by an arcane code that has almost become a secret language. Beijing’s official position is that it would take Taiwan by force if it would declare formal independence; yet the island is a de facto state of 23 million people recognised by 23 nations. For Beijing, the island’s President is the “Taiwan Authority” and it has 1,000 missiles aimed at it. To ensure support at home, President Ma came to power after proclaiming three “no’s”: no unification, no independence and no use of force.
Although President Ma is as determined as the Opposition in seeking modern weapons from the United States for self-defence under the Taiwan Relations Act, he and his party are perceived to be more pro-mainland than the DPP. The last approved US package of military aid was of $5.85 billion, including upgrades for F16s, rather than new warplanes. Despite his “three no’s”, the President sprang a surprise last October by suggesting that Taiwan should “cautiously consider” signing a peace treaty with the mainland in the next decade on three conditions: strong support for Taiwan’s people through a referendum, “meets the needs of the nation” and would be supervised by Taiwan’s legislature. Later, he stressed that a referendum would be necessary.
The irony is that President Ma is far from convincing his people that he is working for the island’s best interests. An August 2011 poll gave a startling result, with only 35.7 per cent believing that he was “trustworthy and has integrity” and 30.8 per cent thought that he “safeguards sovereignty and secures Taiwan’s interests and peace across the Strait”.
Relations between China and President Ma’s KMT are based on the so-called Singapore consensus of 1992 on “one China” and opposition to Taiwan’s independence, with each side interpreting “one China” in its own way. But Ms Tsai’s DPP does not accept the consensus and therefore will not agree to the premise. Polls had shown a dead heat between the two principal candidates, but the incumbent seems to have taken a narrow lead in the last lap. Much will, however, depend upon the third candidate, the independent James Soong, a former heavyweight of the KMT still in the field, likely to cut into the incumbent’s votes.
Beyond the bread and butter issues of economic slowdown, the election campaigns have been dominated by the central argument of the speed and nature of relations with the mainland. President Ma has succeeded in neutralising some of the animosity towards his pro-active approach. According to most recent polls, 46.4 per cent thought that the pace of relations with the mainland was just right, 28.5 per cent viewed it as too fast and 14.4 per cent as too slow.
Left to themselves, the Taiwanese would rather prolong the status quo of de facto independence indefinitely, but mainland China is impatient. Indeed, the apprehension is that if President Ma returns to office, Beijing will intensify pressure on him to move to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s sovereignty faster. With Ms Tsai, it will be a new ball game and a revival of cross-Strait tension. Those inimical to joining up with the mainland suffer from another fear. Economic ties and cross-Strait interaction are gathering such momentum, with billions of Taiwanese money invested on the mainland and large Taiwanese communities living and running manufacturing outfits there that Beijing might simply smother the island in its embrace.
Although the United States was nervous during the Chen era of eight years because calls for independence for the island were raising the regional temperature, Beijing has learnt to be more patient in its attempt to take over Taiwan. At one time US President Bill Clinton had to send an aircraft flotilla to the region to warn China. At the same time, Washington is conscious of Taiwan as a lever against Beijing. But the Taiwan presidential election comes at a delicate time because the Chinese leadership is preparing for a change of guard and contestants for senior positions must not give the impression of weakness.
Whatever the future might hold, the Taiwanese people have given a sterling demonstration of how democratic urges are not alien to a society steeped in Confucius thought. Taiwanese democracy can be boisterous but it works and is a striking contrast to the authoritarian structure on the mainland. The unspoken fear is that with China’s growing strength and assertiveness, the democratic nature of Taiwan’s system might be living on borrowed time. Taiwan is too small to fight its mighty neighbour, and for the United States, the future of the island could be traded off for bigger geopolitical gains.