Ninety per cent of India’s commerce is by sea. At present, 60 per cent of our seaborne trade moves (and comes from) Westwards to Africa, Europe and the US, while 40 per cent moves Eastwards (and comes from) across the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, maritime developments impacting seaborne trade (e.g. Gulf of Aden piracy or the rising maritime tensions in the Asia-Pacific region) need to be monitored closely, and counter measures taken to safeguard our national interests, keeping in mind that sea power takes generations to build up and is directly linked to our national prosperity and security.
The recent spate of events in the seas bordering China and its neighbours (US-South Korea Navy exercises in the Sea of Japan, and the Chinese Navy weapon firing exercises in the South China Sea) have once again highlighted the importance of sea power in the Asia-Pacific region. A few weeks earlier, the US Navy conducted large-scale exercises with other Asia-Pacific regions, and US secretary of state Hillary Clinton sought to internationalise the South China Sea territorial disputes because global commerce flows through it.
Conventional wisdom lists seven “essentials” for a nation to become a great sea power. These are, large size of country, large population, geographic location to dominate sea trade routes, at least two coasts, science-technology-industry, seafaring tradition, and political will of the government to exploit sea power in the national interest.
China does not meet three of the seven “essentials” for sea power, but is striving to overcome these handicaps. Firstly, China has historically not been a seafaring nation, but is learning fast and today its sailors are sailing the world’s oceans on merchantmen, fishing trawlers and warships.
Secondly, though sea commerce flows through the China and Yellow seas, China cannot completely dominate the sea trade routes due to the presence of other modern littoral states.
Thirdly, China has just one coast facing Eastwards, and its exit to the Pacific Ocean “can be blocked” by South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. Its exit southwards towards the Indian Ocean requires it to pass close to Vietnam, and then through the choke points of the straits of Singapore-Malacca, Sunda and Lombok. Almost 90 per cent of China’s oil requirements are imported from West Asia and Angola, and these move by ship through the Indian Ocean choke points which can be blocked in the event of war.
But China has taken the following measures in an attempt to become a global sea power:

w A combination of technology and innovation is being used by China in an ongoing experiment to detect and target “enemy” warships at sea, at long ranges using the 1,800-km range land-based DF-21 ballistic missile, with terminal homing. If the DF-21 experiment succeeds, the concept of sea power will change globally since a similar experiment can later be attempted with the 8,000-km range DF-31 and the 14,000-km range DF-41. The target data for the missiles could be provided by a combination of long range “over the horizon radars” using high frequency “sky waves” along with indigenous satellites for surveillance, communications and navigation data.
w Ongoing attempts to make the South and East China seas its territorial waters, and thus attempt to control international shipping movement, while exploiting the mineral, oil and fishing wealth. On May 16, 2009, China imposed a “summer fishing ban” in the South China Sea and sent ships to enforce this ban, overriding Vietnamese protests about traditional fishing rights. On January 5, 2010, China announced tourism packages to some disputed and uninhabited islands in the South China Sea. On February 9, 2010, China announced new oil and gas fields in the South China Sea, while its similar “finds” in the East China Sea led to Japan appealing to an international maritime court. On April 13, 2010, a flotilla of 10 Chinese warships and submarines passed between the international waters of Japanese islands of Miyako and Okinawa to exercise in the South East Pacific (On July 4, 2010, two Chinese warships repeated this deployment). On June 30, 2010, China announced a six-day live ammunition firing exercise by its Navy in the East China Sea.
w China has financially, militarily and technologically supported two nuclear armed nations (Pakistan and North Korea) to act as its proxies which will, respectively, “distract and engage” India, Japan and South Korea.
w After the failure of half-a-century of coercive diplomacy, China has set out to woo Taiwan. The recent June 29, 2010, ECFA (Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement) to reduce or eliminate tariffs on 539 Chinese items and 267 Taiwanese items, is financially advantageous to Taiwan, but if China eventually achieves reunification with Taiwan, than it removes one strategic geographical obstacle for its Eastwards move to the Pacific Ocean.
w Flush with over $2.5 trillion foreign exchange reserves, China has invested in South Asian and African littoral states so as to secure its sea lanes of commerce and to avoid sending its oil ships through the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok. In pursuance of its “strings of pearls policy”, China not only gifted and built the Gwadar Port for Pakistan (which will unload West Asia oil, to be moved by Chinese-gifted roads and pipelines to China through the proposed Karakoram highway), but is now building ports in three countries which are India’s neighbours. In Sri Lanka the Chinese are funding and building the $9 billion Hambantota seaport (three times larger than Colombo) and the nearby Mattala International Airport, both to be ready by 2015. In Bangladesh the Chinese are funding and building two deep water terminals at Chittagong and a brand new seaport nearby. Both these terminals and the new port will be linked by road and oil pipelines to Kunming in China, and will pass through Burma. Similarly Sittwe deep water port in Burma is being funded and built by China, and will also be connected to Kunming by road and oil pipelines. China has also invested in similar facilities in Tanzania and Angola.
w In 2009, Chinese think tanks suggested that once China gets its own aircraft carrier by about 2015, the US Navy should “look after” the sea area east of Hawaii, while the Chinese Navy would “look after” the rest of the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Chinese investment in nuclear submarines too, will aid a “two ocean deployment capability” in the future.
Strategically-located peninsular India, with 1,197 islands, meets six of the seven requirements of sea power. It only needs to augment its sea power and display palpable political will power to use that sea power in its national interest.

Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam