After nine years in Afghanistan — its longest war — the United States seems to be caught in a quagmire with the Taliban, backed by US ally Pakistan, on the ascendant. Thousands of Afghans have died along with nearly 2,000 ISAF troops, and $300 billion spent on a war that has chronically been under-resourced and self-delusionary. Today, the campaign looks increasingly an exclusive American enterprise, with Canada and the Netherlands deciding to walk out; the German President had to resign over differences and the French also reluctant to continue with this never-ending war. The US commander had to quit amid stories of dissonance among major US policymakers. The British envoy, Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, is on long leave, and Britain’s CDS is to demit office prematurely. The Canadians have just revealed they had unearthed a conspiracy to destroy the Canadian Parliament by a group of 18 home-grown Muslim terrorists angry with the country’s Afghan war involvement.
Afghanistan remains lawless with several governments acting on their own, an ineffective police force and an inept national army that won’t be ready to take on full functions for several years. Many of America’s quixotic adventures were on the advice of Pakistan’s rulers, who led them to believe they could capitalise on the differences between the “good” and “bad” Taliban. Attempts at regime change, by demonising President Hamid Karzai without taking the elementary precaution of identifying a successor, were an incredibly naïve pursuit that created irreconcilable differences between master and ally. Once intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh, who opposed negotiations with the insurgents, was eased out, Mr Karzai could buy local insurance and pursue the policy of chatting up Siraj Haqqani under close Pakistani supervision.
Late in the day, perhaps, US and other Western think tanks and media have begun to acknowledge the source and gravity of the problem. The latest and most comprehensive was the Rand Corporation paper by Christine Fair and Seth Jones, which highlights the terrorist threat not only to the region and the world but to Pakistan itself. While suggesting that Pakistan abandon its policy of using terror as a foreign policy weapon, the authors also asked the US to revisit its own policy of too many carrots and too few sticks. The LSE report authored by Matt Waldman on the Pakistan government’s official policy of supporting, through the ISI, Afghan insurgents (Taliban and the Haqqani network) only embellishes what has been stated here in India for years, known in the West but rarely openly acknowledged. Further, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s growing profile in Afghanistan means Pakistan seeks to use this trusted jihadi organisation as insurance in case the Taliban turn rogue. It is an unfortunate measure of Pakistani leaders’ all-consuming hostility towards India that they would rather cohabit with a retrograde organisation like the Taliban instead of seeking a compromise with India.
The sudden publication of what is really old news about the trillion-dollar mineral reserves in Afghanistan is a new factor. Will the global war on terror, once described as unwinnable by President Barack Obama, now become a winnable war for resources? These are all heavy-investment and long-gestation projects that only the rich and powerful can manage. But there is no magic wand for instant riches and stability for Afghanistan’s poor. The fear is that Afghanistan, as the land bridge between Central Asia and the rest of Asia, will go further downhill amid increased violence among its various ethnic groups. A significant number of these forces would be provided by jihadi foot soldiers from Pakistan.
These reports, about the Pakistan Army’s control over the Taliban, the presence of its surrogates in Afghanistan along with reports of exploitable vital minerals in that country and the slowing down of the Kandahar and North Waziristan operations, could suggest there is a deal on the anvil. The West withdraws its fighting forces substantially, outsources security of its projects to private military contractors while exploiting minerals. Pakistan will have attained strategic depth and security through the Taliban and Haqqani networks.
It is sometimes forgotten that in the ultimate analysis, the Taliban are Pashtun who live on both sides of the Durand Line, and there has been an upsurge in anti-Pashtun violence in Balochistan, Karachi and Fata. It might not be long before there is an upsurge of the demand for a Greater Pushtunistan once the foreigner (and common enemy) has departed, and Pashtuns internalise their problems swept under the carpet by successive regimes. Pashtun assertiveness will almost certainly lead to retaliation from Afghanistan’s other ethnic groups. Religious obscurantism combined with ultra-nationalism can be a very explosive mix.
The future looks uncertain and violent unless there is an all-nations guarantee for Afghan neutrality and non-interference by other powers. It is a fair assumption that Mr Karzai’s Afghanistan is unravelling fast and no one really has any idea how to prevent this. The Saudi-Wahhabi and the Pakistan-military nexus, the latter’s nexus with Afghan drug lords, worth billions of dollars, appears to be picking up the pieces in a divided country.
The cure, if any, lies in Pakistan — where all Afghan-specific and India-specific insurgent/terrorist groups take shelter, receive support and now coalesce for Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives. So far India been comfortable with its infrastructure assistance to Afghans, while others battled for bigger stakes. This situation will change, with Pakistan remaining hostile despite the recent veneer of bonhomie.
China, with ambitions to reach the Persian Gulf, is the rising power seeking space and resource bases for itself, with Pakistan as its staunch ally. India needs to strengthen its relations with Iran and Russia, who would be similarly affected by the rise of Taliban, for access to Central Asia and West Asia. Despite the odds against us, India’s profile in Afghanistan must not be lowered. If Kashmir is an all-time issue for Pakistan, so should Gilgit and Baltistan — a geo-strategic jugular for both Pakistan and China — be for India. It would be sound policy to modernise our defence forces in all aspects, especially maritime. The region will eventually normalise only when the Pakistan Army, whose policies have hurt the Pakistani people immeasurably, normalises like other armies.

Vikram Sood is a former head of the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s external intelligence agency