The dastardly 26/11 terrorist attack by 10 youth highly trained and indoctrinated by the Pakistan’s military intelligence and leaders of terrorist groups created and supported by it shook the entire nation and brought out glaring lacunae in coastal security mechanism in the country.
The recent 13/7 attack followed by drifting ships should remind us how much we have learnt, or not learnt from it.
While the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard have been working closely with the various government agencies of coastal states for establishing a synergised coastal security mechanism in accordance with the Cabinet Committee on Security’s directives issued in February 2009, only some progress has been made and interim SOPs (standard operating procedures) promulgated for joint patrolling in territorial waters and revalidated regularly through conduct of security exercises like Sagar Kavach.
The efficacy of the system has shown up by inputs of a few real time threats to the state being received through various intelligence inputs, but there are still many gaps in the system which need to be filled. During various joint coastal security operations conducted, a number of inadequacies in the system came to light. In one of such exercise on the Maharashtra coast, the following breaches from sea could be effected without deterrence:
a. Landing of hijacked boats by fidayeen at Badhwar Park, Uttan Jetty and Juhu Beach.
b. Attack at Ratnagiri Port using a hijacked boat and securing it alongside a merchant vessel undetected.
c. Hijacking of merchant vessel at Mumbai anchorage.
d. Attack at Dhabol Port single buoy mooring by boat.
The recent drifting of foreign ships into Mumbai’s waters, while causing a nuisance and costly, time-consuming and painful corrective measures, came under focus of MPs during the August session. On August 3 and 24, defence minister A.K. Antony was at pains to answer some questions on maritime security.
The two cargo vessels, MV Wisdom and MT Pavit, ran aground off the Mumbai coast during June-July 2011. MV Wisdom, being towed from Colombo to Alang for dismantling, lost tow approximately 12 NM west of Mumbai harbour and due to prevalent adverse sea conditions finally ran aground at Juhu beach on the night of June 11, 2011. On July 31, 2011, MT Pavit was found grounded 1-2 metre deep in position 14 NM north of Colaba Point, Mumbai. Inputs indicated that this ship is a bonafide vessel which has Indian crew. M/s Pavit Shipping Lines, Dubai, are the registered owners. The vessel was abandoned on June 30, 2011 off Oman due to engine failure and ingress of water. All 13 Indian crew were evacuated by a Royal Navy warship and transferred to MT Jag Pushpa for disembarkment at Sikka, Gujarat. The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Mumbai remained in touch with the vessel throughout the ordeal till abandoning and, thereafter, requested the owner to monitor the vessel. The owners informed the MRCC that the vessel had already sunk as reported by the UK Maritime Trade Organisation.
Mr Antony conveyed that analysis carried out by the Indian Navy has revealed that the reasons for non-detection of MV Pavit could possibly be attributed to a report of the vessel having been sunk, the drift path of the ship through areas not covered by radar, prevailing monsoon weather in the area, precluding satisfactory detection by radar or visual identification and MT Pavit’s automatic identification system not functioning due to no power supply or batteries on the ship. Mr Antony reiterated what he had stated in a written reply in Parliament three weeks earlier, on August 3, 2011, that the government has initiated several measures to strengthen coastal security, which includes improving surveillance mechanism and enhanced patrolling by following an integrated approach. Joint operational exercises are conducted on regular basis among the Navy, Coast Guard, coastal police, customs and others to check the effectiveness of this approach adopted for security of coastal areas, including island territories. Further, continuous review and monitoring of various mechanisms have been established by the government at different levels. The intelligence mechanism has also been streamlined through the creation of joint operation centres and multi-agency coordination mechanism. Installation of radars covering entire coastline and islands is also an essential part of this process.
On the same day in Parliament, Mr Antony recalled the Cabinet Commi-ttee on Security’s February 16, 2009 review of the coastal security apparatus and listed actions recommended:
a. Setting up of joint operation centres at Mumbai, Visakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair, jointly manned and operated by the Navy and Coast Guard.
b. Establishment of a National Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence Network for a real-time maritime domain awareness linking operations rooms of the Navy and Coast Guard, both at the field and the top levels.
c. Action initiated for formation of “Sagar Prahari Bal”, comprising 1,000 men and 80 fast interceptor crafts for protection of naval bases and co-located vulnerable assets and vulnerable points.
d. Enhanced surface and air surveillance by the Navy and Coast Guard Ships and aircraft along the coast and in all offshore development areas.
e. Coastal security exercises conducted regularly on the east and west coasts.
f. Awareness drives conducted by the Navy and the Coast Guard to sensitise the fishing communities on issues related to threats from sea.
g. Long-term measures, including setting up of a Coastal Radar Station change and auto identification system.
h. Steps taken under the coastal security scheme for strengthening of the Marine Police Force.
In view of all the above, further vital measures required to be taken are:
a. A monitoring mechanism and regulatory framework by DG Shipping, MMB, fisheries department and other agencies for coastal and inland water traffic, which involves regulating and monitoring movement of coastal shipping, especially fishing boats, sand barges, sailing vessel, pleasure craft, yacht, private boats, ferries, etc. with specific entry and exit points with positive identification. What goes out and comes in must be known and monitored by some agency. There should be separate lanes for fishing vessels and barges.
b. Port security needs to be strengthened by regular sea front patrolling by CISF/port security boats, which must check all persons on entering and exiting port. Suspected vessels should be rummaged and checked at anchorage prior to permitting them entry to port by customs.
c. The Implementation of International Ship and Port Facility Security Code must be strictly adhered to by instituting control and compliance measures, for which there is no mechanism in place so far. There must be rigorous port state control, with permanent security measures for all minor ports.
d. Fishing/Marine conservation society measures need ensure:
1. Mandatory registration of all fishing vessels.
2. Drastic reduction in number of landing points for ease of monitoring.
3. Setting up of police outposts/appointing special police officers at landing points.
4. Village head and Sagar Suraksha Dal to be made accountable in the coastal security mechanism.
5. Promulgation of specific duration and area for fishing.
6. Instituting group fishing.
7. Issue of smart cards/biometric cards, e-registration, colour coding, identity cards etc. on priority.
8. Action against fishing vessels engaged in activities such as tourism, cargo handling, etc.
e. Safety and security mechanism requires measures like installing transponde-rs/RFIDs on fishing boats and smaller crafts to enable tracking/identification; installing proper communication, navigation and safety equipment onboard fishing boats, barges and other smaller crafts; wide publicity to SAR (search and rescue) number 1554 and coastal security number 1093 amongst local populace and a frequent community interaction programme to sensitise local populace on coastal security issues and also to generate goodwill to make fishing community as “eyes & ears”.
f. Strengthening coastal security police requires implementation of phase-II plan of CSP; early procurement of CSP patrol boats, including man power; daily basis sharing of deployment of patrol boats; fitment of compatible marine communication equi-pment onboard patrolling units; publishing coastal mapping charts clearly indicating details of fishing harbours, landing points, jurisdiction of coastal police station, etc.
Maharashtra has a coastline of 720 km and a 1,000-km creek line. Six of its coastal districts are Mumbai, Navi Mumbai, Thane, Raigarh, Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg. It has 16 islands, six of which are uninhabited. It has two major and 48 non-major ports. Of the 19 marine police stations 12 are of PH-I and seven are of PH-II classification. There are 21,500 mechanised and 2,032 non-mechanised fishing vessels owned/manned by a fishing population numbering approximately 2,66,594. There are 631 landing points, including 555 fishing harbours/fishing points/jetties and 76 other landing points 56 of which are in Mumbai’s jurisdiction.
Mumbai and suburban areas have a coastline of approximately 90 km and a deep water harbour area of approximately 400 square km, with 3,772 mechanised and 187 non-mechanised fishing vessels and a fishing population approximately 22,741 spread over 25 fishing villages and two fish processing centres at Sasoon Dock and Bhaucha Dhakka.
All this means a lot of urgent steps to be taken by the government agencies and a notification for all of them to function under coordination of the Navy as decided after 26/11.