India or Pak: Time for US to choose
March.25 : Pakistan is not going to acquire a nuclear deal with the United States similar to India’s in a hurry, but the mood music coming out of Washington is an indication of the light years the two countries have travelled since the days the world sat agog soaking in details of the amazing nuclear arms bazar that A.Q. Khan had opened for business.
That the US is now willing “to listen” to Pakistan’s plea and, in US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s words, “going to be considering it”, is a warning signal to India of the storms ahead in the Indo-US strategic partnership.
The United States chose to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s efforts to secure a nuclear weapon in the 1980s because Islamabad was helping chase the Soviets out of Afghanistan. And the US was later prepared to buy the fiction that the Khan business venture in nuclear weapons was a one-man enterprise. Fast forward to 2010: it is now willing to humour Pakistan to consider its request for breaching the international nuclear regime in a first Cabinet-level strategic dialogue with Islamabad.
The reasons for the American about-face are clear enough. Pakistan is key to American plans in Afghanistan in coping with the Taliban and Al Qaeda militarily and in what is now becoming the flavour of the season in midwifing talks with the militants to speed up the withdrawal of US and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces from Afghanistan. Together with the surge in troop levels the Obama administration announced while setting a target date for beginning withdrawal, Washington has showered Islamabad with a generous bounty in money and arms.
The immediate issue India has to face is to recognise that Indian and American objectives diverge in Afghanistan and these divergences cannot but have an impact on the Indo-American relationship. The divergence flows from the American belief that given Pakistan’s geography and its record of nurturing extremists as a matter of state policy, Islamabad was essential to its future plans in Afghanistan. In any event, even in the days of the George W. Bush presidency America’s “war on terror” was restricted in scope and did not encompass helping India fight Pakistan-sponsored terrorists in Kashmir and elsewhere in the country. The Mumbai carnage changed the picture to an extent by an American willingness to share intelligence data, even as a new test lies ahead in granting access to interview David Coleman Headley, the Pakistani-American who has pleaded guilty in an American court to helping stage the Mumbai tragedy.
The Indian approach to Afghanistan is quite different because it wants to maintain its traditional presence there and wishes to ensure that any withdrawal of Western forces takes place after ensuring that a moderate stable Afghan dispensation can take effect. As it is, the prospect of this happening is not rosy, given the recently-retired United Nations representative there publicly acknowledging that he was talking to the Taliban leadership, until Islamabad spoiled the budding discourse by arresting the militants’ number two leader in Karachi. Obviously, Islamabad wants to be a primary mediator in any deal that is cut between the West and the Taliban in Afghanistan to ensure that it maintains preponderant influence there.
Knowing the stakes involved, Pakistan’s approach to Washington is clear. It has been sending signals that India should reduce its presence there — a point made on its behalf by the earlier bombing outside the Indian embassy in Kabul and the more recent bombing of Indian-patronised guesthouses there. Second, Islamabad is seeking to mount pressure through the US on India to come to the table to discuss the Kashmir issue. And its constant refrain for American benefit has been that the threat it perceives from India does not permit it to send more troops to fight the militants, particularly in the semi-autonomous tribal belt. The Pakistan Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who has taken charge of the Washington strategic dialogue (a singular development in itself), has made his views public.
The problem for India is two-fold: safeguarding its important relationship with Washington and to make it loud and clear to the US that this relationship will be adversely affected by the extent to which the United States chooses to tilt towards Pakistan for short-term gains. It might be a replay of an old gramophone record, but the stakes are higher this time around because, whatever Washington’s immediate compulsions, India cannot but ensure its national interests in a dangerous neighbourhood.
External affairs minister S.M. Krishna has already reacted to the new developments in measured tones, but a lot more needs to be done to impress on Washington how seriously New Delhi views the beginning of what must surely represent the sea-change that has taken place in Washington in how it conceives Pakistan’s nuclear policies. Every US administration has its own policies and priorities, and US President Barack Obama obviously wants to wind down the two wars he was bequeathed by his predecessor. New Delhi must make it clear that it will fight to safeguard its interests by calling a spade a spade.
The danger for India is not alleviated by the inevitability of the long gestation period any reversal of America’s nuclear policy on Pakistan would involve, including sharp opposition from many on Capitol Hill. The essence of any reliable partnership is the element of trust that exists between two parties. The United States should be told in plain language that if it chooses to cosy up to Pakistan in the nuclear field, it would be damaging the structure of the Indo-American strategic relationship, so recently capped by the civil nuclear deal.
That the US is now willing “to listen” to Pakistan’s plea and, in US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s words, “going to be considering it”, is a warning signal to India of the storms ahead in the Indo-US strategic partnership.
The United States chose to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s efforts to secure a nuclear weapon in the 1980s because Islamabad was helping chase the Soviets out of Afghanistan. And the US was later prepared to buy the fiction that the Khan business venture in nuclear weapons was a one-man enterprise. Fast forward to 2010: it is now willing to humour Pakistan to consider its request for breaching the international nuclear regime in a first Cabinet-level strategic dialogue with Islamabad.
The reasons for the American about-face are clear enough. Pakistan is key to American plans in Afghanistan in coping with the Taliban and Al Qaeda militarily and in what is now becoming the flavour of the season in midwifing talks with the militants to speed up the withdrawal of US and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces from Afghanistan. Together with the surge in troop levels the Obama administration announced while setting a target date for beginning withdrawal, Washington has showered Islamabad with a generous bounty in money and arms.
The immediate issue India has to face is to recognise that Indian and American objectives diverge in Afghanistan and these divergences cannot but have an impact on the Indo-American relationship. The divergence flows from the American belief that given Pakistan’s geography and its record of nurturing extremists as a matter of state policy, Islamabad was essential to its future plans in Afghanistan. In any event, even in the days of the George W. Bush presidency America’s “war on terror” was restricted in scope and did not encompass helping India fight Pakistan-sponsored terrorists in Kashmir and elsewhere in the country. The Mumbai carnage changed the picture to an extent by an American willingness to share intelligence data, even as a new test lies ahead in granting access to interview David Coleman Headley, the Pakistani-American who has pleaded guilty in an American court to helping stage the Mumbai tragedy.
The Indian approach to Afghanistan is quite different because it wants to maintain its traditional presence there and wishes to ensure that any withdrawal of Western forces takes place after ensuring that a moderate stable Afghan dispensation can take effect. As it is, the prospect of this happening is not rosy, given the recently-retired United Nations representative there publicly acknowledging that he was talking to the Taliban leadership, until Islamabad spoiled the budding discourse by arresting the militants’ number two leader in Karachi. Obviously, Islamabad wants to be a primary mediator in any deal that is cut between the West and the Taliban in Afghanistan to ensure that it maintains preponderant influence there.
Knowing the stakes involved, Pakistan’s approach to Washington is clear. It has been sending signals that India should reduce its presence there — a point made on its behalf by the earlier bombing outside the Indian embassy in Kabul and the more recent bombing of Indian-patronised guesthouses there. Second, Islamabad is seeking to mount pressure through the US on India to come to the table to discuss the Kashmir issue. And its constant refrain for American benefit has been that the threat it perceives from India does not permit it to send more troops to fight the militants, particularly in the semi-autonomous tribal belt. The Pakistan Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who has taken charge of the Washington strategic dialogue (a singular development in itself), has made his views public.
The problem for India is two-fold: safeguarding its important relationship with Washington and to make it loud and clear to the US that this relationship will be adversely affected by the extent to which the United States chooses to tilt towards Pakistan for short-term gains. It might be a replay of an old gramophone record, but the stakes are higher this time around because, whatever Washington’s immediate compulsions, India cannot but ensure its national interests in a dangerous neighbourhood.
External affairs minister S.M. Krishna has already reacted to the new developments in measured tones, but a lot more needs to be done to impress on Washington how seriously New Delhi views the beginning of what must surely represent the sea-change that has taken place in Washington in how it conceives Pakistan’s nuclear policies. Every US administration has its own policies and priorities, and US President Barack Obama obviously wants to wind down the two wars he was bequeathed by his predecessor. New Delhi must make it clear that it will fight to safeguard its interests by calling a spade a spade.
The danger for India is not alleviated by the inevitability of the long gestation period any reversal of America’s nuclear policy on Pakistan would involve, including sharp opposition from many on Capitol Hill. The essence of any reliable partnership is the element of trust that exists between two parties. The United States should be told in plain language that if it chooses to cosy up to Pakistan in the nuclear field, it would be damaging the structure of the Indo-American strategic relationship, so recently capped by the civil nuclear deal.
S. Nihal Singh
