U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to India comes at a time when the relationship is poised menacingly between the doubts of the past and opportunities of the future. It can as easily jerk forward as regress or stall. The two democracies were mostly estranged partners till the Cold War ended in 1990. Their serious engagement really began after India’s nuclear tests in May 1998. It commenced the journey which can see them as close partners, perhaps unlikely allies, but essential components of a 21st century world order. The trumpets may be premature.
The Obama administration began hesitantly, picking up the threads from George W. Bush’s intense India fling. It stuck to the letter of the civil nuclear deal, cocking a snook at its spirit. Mr Obama chaired UN Security Council (UNSC) in September 2009 which passed a resolution prescribing for India Non-Proliferation Treaty signature as a non-nuclear weapon state, a negation of the very status India had acquired with the India-US deal. Similarly India was out of the loop on the new AfPak policy, arousing suspicions that we were headed to the past.
On the positive side, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was the first official visitor hosted by the Obamas. A return visit in Mr Obama’s first term raises the hope that, like the US and China, the two countries will exchange frequent visits at the highest level. Bilateral relations hinge as much on the big ticket issues as on mundane matters. The US wants its concerns over the liability of civil nuclear material and equipment suppliers to be allayed. A compromise could be India’s signing of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation. The ramifications, as usual not debated in public, may be that the signing conflicts Indian law. Defence sales are high on the US list, though overshadowed by their sales to Pakistan and the past unreliability. Trade issues would also figure, including foreign direct investment in retail.
India has its own list. The January 2004 commitment of Next Steps in a Strategic Partnership remains unfulfilled. Dual-use technology restrictions still persist. Some announcements relaxing the regime may come during the visit. The US should support Indian membership of the four groups that constitute the extended non-proliferation regime i.e. Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar and the Australia Groups. Finally, the US needs to throw its weight behind India’s aspiration for a permanent seat at the UNSC and expanded role at the Bretton Woods Institutions i.e. World Bank, International Monetary Fund etc. The lurking monster of US protectionism and Mr Obama’s tirade against outsourcing needs an honest discussion.
The thousand pound gorilla in the room is Pakistan. Bob Woodword’s book Obama’s Wars gives timely insight into internal debates on Pakistan and Afghanistan. A recurring question was “How do we change Pakistan’s calculus?” Mr Obama had sent his national security adviser, Gen. James Jones, and Central Intelligence Agency head Leon Panetta on May 19, 2010 to tell the Pakistanis that the Faisal Shahzad case, the Time Square bomber, left Pakistan with borrowed time. The next attack in the US traced to Pakistan would force the hand of the US President, triggering automatic retribution. A surprised Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari reportedly inquired if this is what a strategic relationship implied. What was not mentioned was that the US would hit 150 designated terrorist safe-havens in Pakistan. The US sought full intelligence cooperation, more counter-terrorism help, faster visa issuance to US officials and sharing of airline passenger data. They also want their Predators to operate outside the boxes cleared by Pakistan. During the recent US-Pakistan strategic dialogue in Washington $2.29 billion of military aid was cleared, in addition to the $1.6 billion earlier given as Coalition Support Funds for operations from May 2008 to March 2009. Perhaps the US have got the commitments from Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani on their wishlist. Woodward recounts in detail the contrarian views in Washington that Pakistani calculus will be unaffected by carrots. A comprehensive counter-insurgency operation was ruled out because of its high cost ($1 trillion) and its length (six to eight years). The Biden formula of counter-terrorism, by a smaller US force and largely from the air was found unlikely to meet the objectives. The aim now is to “degrade” and not defeat the Taliban. A crucial component is Pakistani action against Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani group. This pincer movement is supposed to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, allowing the Afghan National Security Forces to build-up capacity and take over the security duties from the International Security Assistance Force.
On January 5, 1954 President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration approved military assistance to Pakistan, as a precursor to it joining Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation and the Baghdad Pact. The common foe was communism, which Pakistan later declined to face in Vietnam. Now the antagonist is radical Islam in the form of Al Qaeda and Taliban. We are being asked to believe that infusion of latest military equipment will change Pakistan’s calculus. The challenge for Dr Singh is to work out with Mr Obama an end game that does not allow Karl Marx’s maxim to be proven, with history now repeating itself as a farce, the tragedies of misused US military aid already enacted in 1965 and 1971. At this crucial juncture the two sides need an honest exchange on their options on alternative futures that flow from China egging on Pakistan and Iran as surrogate outliers to tie down the reigning hegemon, the US, and the incipient power, India.

The author is a former secretary in the external affairs ministry