Prime Minster Jawaharlal Nehru’s Teen Murti study had a bronze cast of Abraham Lincoln’s right hand, given by an American, Arthur E. Morgan, in 1949. In a 1956 Washington D.C. speech he said: “I look at it every day, and it gives me strength”. US President Barack H. Obama, 61 years later, replaced in the Oval Office Winston Churchill’s bust with Lincoln’s, his homage to a President who wagered all for equality. Mr Obama addressed representatives of 1.2 billion Indians, in the Central Hall on November 8, to recall an additional debt to Mahatma Gandhi, the inspirer of Martin Luther King Jr. and earlier Nehru.

These powerful images emerged belatedly after a Mumbai muddle. Staying at the restored Taj, a symbol of the 26/11 carnage, and meeting survivors and victims’ relatives, a perfect stage existed for a powerful denunciation of terrorism, blatantly sponsored by Pakistan. Instead we got nervous hand-wringing and token condemnation. Even a teenager’s pointed question on why the US did not declare Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism elicited rehearsed equivocation. The joint statement, issued at 8.30 pm on November 8, well after the substantive part of the visit was over, on the contrary, is forthright that “all terrorist networks, including Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, must be defeated”. Was this poor message management by team Obama or did the public furore compel a rethink?
The positives from the visit were many but surfaced sporadically or belatedly, the joint statement missing the news cycle. The US support for Indian membership of the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement), was leaked by the US side in Mumbai. The lifting of the high-technology restrictions was in the PM’s statement at the post-talks press conference at Hyderabad House, as was US support for Indian permanent seat at the UN’s Security Council teasingly hinted by Mr Obama but revealed only in his Parliament address, albeit with a tutorial on Iran and Burma. All told, this dissipated the effect of substantive US support to integrate India into the rule-making regimes on dual-use technologies and lifting of restrictions on high-technology trade, thus unshackling the Indian economy for high growth and sustainable development.
The challenge for team Obama was that President Bush’s act was difficult to follow. There was no “big ticket” takeaway. Additionally, President Obama in 2009, distracted by the global financial crisis, withdrawal from Iraq and planning a surge in Afghanistan, was not India-focused. The civil nuclear debate got hijacked by the NPT Review Conference and his own non-proliferation agenda. The conflicting signals raised questions whether he was resetting India-US relations? Disjointedly, but certainly, he has now managed to address Indian concerns and aspirations. On Afghanistan he has indicated no rushed exit and greater India-US exchanges, telling Pakistan and their Taliban associates that a reversion to the 1996-2001 Taliban-led and ISI encouraged regime in Kabul was not on the US script. By flatteringly calling India a risen and not a rising power, welcoming greater Indian engagement with East Asia and emphasising the need for an open and equitable Asian security order, he has calmed Indian fears over a US tilt towards China.
A new element, relating to Mr Obama’s African roots, is the India-US partnership in Africa. This, too, subtly brings in the Chinese role in that continent, building transactional relationships that do not take into account the nature of the regimes or the relevance of Chinese investment to the livelihood of the African people.
On the eve of his October 1949 US visit, Nehru wrote to his sister and Indian ambassador to Washington Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit that “I want to be friendly with the Americans but always making it clear what we stand for, I want to make no commitments which come in the way of our basic policy...” If the Nehruvian maxim held good when India was economically feeble and buffeted by Cold War pressures, it is even more apposite for a rising India. Naturally the Indian tactics must evolve to maximise advantages while safeguarding our values and interests. India shall be a pole in a multi-polar world, both shaping the 21st century world and being shaped by it. The instruments for this global transmutation are: on economic and financial matters the G20; on security and political matters, the UN Security Council; and on emerging technologies the Quadruple regimes.
The challenges ahead are illustrated by three current issues. For instance, India can work with US on humanitarian relief (Tsunami, etc) and counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean but resists Proliferation Security Initiative or UNSC plus sanctions against Iran (implemented by EU and even some members of the GCC). Even over Burma the differences have been over tactics, US preferring condemnation and isolation and India favouring public engagement and private counselling. With elections over and Aung San Suu Kyi released, perhaps Indian and the US approaches can converge. The dynamic of UNSC reform is not US led; it is US defended, with clear US red lines. They reject veto for new permanent members and want a modest expansion beyond the current 15. For a two-third majority for UN charter amending, African and Latin American interests, both unrepresented currently, and that of Asia takes it up to 25. The African spoilers in addition insist on a veto-wielding seat, which US rejects.
The path is long, the climb steep but Obama visit has consolidated India and US partnership, and it may even be discounting for political hyperbole, a defining one of the 21st century.

The author is a former secretary in the external affairs ministry