The killing of Osama bin Laden is significant on two counts. It marks the end of a 10-year hunt for the mastermind of the horrendous 9/11 tragedy — the death of some 3,000 people in New York’s Twin Towers, in the Pentagon in Washington and on remote fields as another plane went down after it was wrestled down by passengers.

Second, the scene of the firefight, so close to Pakistan’s capital Islamabad and the Army headquarters in Rawalpindi, is symptomatic of the American problem in the war on terror: Pakistan’s importance in the operations and its complicity in the web of terrorism woven around Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
Osama’s death, in a sense, represents a closure of the deep wounds inflicted on the American psyche by the greatest peace-time attack on American soil.
It also signified the new form of terror in that a group of dedicated men relying on a terrorism network halfway around the globe could make missiles of passenger planes to bring down two of New York’s symbols of economic power and a portion of the Pentagon representing American military might. But of greater interest to America and the world will be the long-term implications of Osama’s death on the future of US troops in Afghanistan and the unravelling or otherwise of the US-Pakistan relationship.
In one respect, it makes plans for the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan easier. Former US President George W. Bush’s much-derided call, after the American Wild West fashion, for Osama to be delivered “dead or alive” has finally been answered. But US policymakers are still wrestling with how and when to leave Afghanistan and what kind of a post-withdrawal military presence it should maintain. Second, Pakistan’s frantic efforts to put in place an alternative policy in league with Afghanistan, and possibly China, reveal an impatience with a scheme of things in which the Pakistan Army believes it might be short-changed.
What it also reveals is the mutual lack of trust between the US and Pakistan — like a quarrelling couple threatening to divorce and shying away from it, neither party seems to reach the breaking point.
For US President Barack Obama, Osama’s death is a welcome development for his re-election campaign, besieged as he has been by a sea of problems in the economic and political spheres. But he has to be ready for a backlash by supporters of Osama who would naturally try to seek revenge for the killing of their iconic leader.
In Pakistan, there will be some soul-searching on where the Army goes from here. Perhaps, Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani will take it as an indication that his own plans for Afghanistan should be speeded up in a changing environment.
It is no longer news to the United States, India or the rest of the world that Pakistan has thus far been successfully running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. The crucial point is what happens next. President Obama cannot simply fold up his tent and leave Afghanistan, as the US did once before. On the other hand, Pakistan still remains important for the US, given its geographical location, the terrorist web it is part of even as it has also become its victim and its aim of seeking to build a privileged relationship with Afghanistan.
Washington does not believe that it is in its interest to abandon the billions of dollars it has been giving the country in military and economic aid and say goodbye.
Yet there are valid reasons to believe that the US-Pakistan relationship will take a new turn now that the inspiration and financier of Al Qaeda is gone. In Washington, this will trigger moves for seeking greater accountability for Islamabad’s actions, particularly in relation to its funding and support for elements of the Taliban leadership.
Besides, there will be increasing efforts to get Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai to come clean on his future plans. Reports of Islamabad offering him a deal to change his alliance with the US for a pact with China and Pakistan have inevitably raised many eyebrows.
It remains to be seen how the absence of Osama will impact Al Qaeda. As America has discovered, Al Qaeda has, over the years, become something of a franchise operation, seeking inspiration from one source but autonomous in its operations and funding in countries in which it operates. But it would be difficult to over-emphasise Osama’s role as the lodestar for the ranks of terrorist outfits. Neither his accepted No. 2, Ayman Zawahiri, nor anyone else can be a substitute. Osama’s own story is well-known. He used his share of his family’s fortune for the cause of jihad after his baptism under American benediction to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, returned to Saudi Arabia after the Soviet withdrawal to agitate for the withdrawal of US troops, went to Sudan and thence back to Afghanistan, then under the control of the Taliban. The rest, as they say, is history.
In the end, the future scenario of Afghanistan will determine, to an extent, how Al Qaeda develops in the absence of Osama. The Arab world is in ferment, with two Presidents already toppled, a third on the way to being removed and turmoil in other countries signalling a rare moment of hope. The fact that these breathtaking events can take place through methods other than those adopted by Al Qaeda and its offshoots should dent the appeal of extremist violence for the disenfranchised young. In part, it will of course depend on how the American establishment pursues its national interests.
After the relatively smooth changes in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya has muddied the waters and the geopolitical interests of Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Sunni world have, for the moment, triumphed over the wishes of the majority in Bahrain. But it will be difficult to stem the changes lit by
the spark in Tunisia last December.
American perseverance has paid off in finally getting its quarry. Now it is up to the US establishment to convert its success into the proverbial peace dividend.
 
S. Nihal Singh can be contacted at snihalsingh@gmail.com